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Life without parole for juveniles
and the retroactivity mess
ver the past year, the
Illinois appellate
courts have been
making a muddle of
our state’s retroactivity doctrine, stretching the law
by ordering some prisoners who
committed murders as juveniles
to be resentenced.
The impulse is honorable, but
the legal reasoning is flimsy.
Cleaning up the mess is a job for
the Illinois General Assembly.
It all started in 2012, when the
U.S. Supreme Court issued a
momentous decision in a
criminal case called Miller v.
Alabama. The court held that
state sentencing schemes
mandating life in prison without
the possibility of parole (LWOP)
for juvenile murderers violated
the Eighth Amendment.
Miller was accepted in the
legal community with little
acrimony. Although the decision
irked some commentators, most
of us were comfortable acknowledging that the immaturity and
impetuosity of juveniles typically
make them less morally culpable
than adults.
Besides, the Supreme Court
had banned only mandatory
LWOP sentencing schemes, not
those where judges retained
discretion to issue a lesser
sentence. The very worst
youthful offenders, therefore,
could still remain behind bars for
life.
Miller made the mandatory
sentencing rules for juveniles in
26 states and in the federal
government unconstitutional.
But a vexing question remained.
Should the Miller rule apply
retroactively to prisoners who
had already been sentenced,
perhaps years ago, under
mandatory LWOP rules?
It’s true that new rules for the
conduct of criminal trials must
be applied to cases that are still
pending. But once the direct

O

appeal process is complete, the
Constitution doesn’t require the
state to reopen the case.
It’s up to the states to
determine when to apply new
rules to already-final cases. And
indeed, some states give their
courts the ability to apply new
rules to all cases, whether final
or not, in order to assure that
similarly situated defendants are
treated equally.
But other states have adopted
more stringent rules, acknowledging that both victims of crime
and society at large have an
interest in bringing closure to
criminal cases.
Illinois is one of the parsimonious states. In 1990, in People v.
Flowers, the Illinois Supreme
Court adopted the restrictive
federal standard of Teague v.
Lane (1989) for determining
when a new rule should be
applied retroactively to final
cases.
Under Teague and Flowers, a
newly announced rule will not be
applied to already-final cases
with two exceptions.
First, the new rule will have
full retroactive effect when it is
“substantive” in nature, meaning
that the rule “places certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power
of the criminal law-making
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authority to proscribe.” For
example, if a law banning homosexual sodomy were deemed
unconstitutional, a defendant
would be entitled to a reversal of
his conviction regardless of
whether his case was final or not.
Likewise, “rules prohibiting a
certain category of punishment
for a class of defendants because
of their status or offense” are
considered substantive and
therefore retroactive. Penry v.
Lynaugh (1989). In Penry, the
Supreme Court held that the
execution of persons with mental
retardation violated the Eighth
Amendment and that this rule
was substantive and, therefore,
retroactive.
The second exception to
Teague is for constitutional rules
of criminal procedure that are
“watershed” in nature, “implicating the fundamental fairness
and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.” Watershed rules
alter our understanding of the
procedural elements essential for
a fair trial.
The only example to date of a
rule that would meet this
standard, according to the
Supreme Court, was the holding
in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
that any indigent defendant

charged with a felony must be
provided with counsel.
Given these standards, should
the Miller rule (forbidding imposition of an LWOP sentence
where the judge had no discretion to give a lesser term) be
applied retroactively to the
estimated 105 final cases in
Illinois where a minor defendant
was convicted of murder?
Our appellate courts have so
far said yes. But common sense —
as well as every other state and
federal court to have applied
Teague to the question —
suggests the correct answer is no.
First, Miller is not a new
substantive rule. The primary
individual conduct engaged in by
the juvenile defendants was
murder and murder by juveniles
has not been decriminalized. Nor
has the Supreme Court prohibited a category of punishment for
a class of defendants. After all,
LWOP sentences for juveniles
are still allowed so long as
certain procedures — i.e.,
allowing judges to consider
lesser sentences — are followed.
Nonetheless, a panel of the 1st
District, in People v. Morfin
(2012), concluded that Miller did
announce a new substantive rule,
because it “mandates a
sentencing range broader than
that provided by statute for
minors convicted of first-degree
murder.”
It’s not clear why this observation about the breadth of
sentencing led the court to
conclude that the new Miller rule
was substantive, at least under
the first exception to the Teague
standard.
In fact, another 1st District
panel held quite the opposite,
stating in People v. Williams
(2012) that the Miller rule was
procedural. Although its
reasoning was irreconcilable
with Morfin, the Williams court
likewise concluded that Miller
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should have retroactive effect
because it was not only procedural, but “watershed” too, thus
satisfying the second Teague
exception.
This holding is fanciful. Since
issuing Teague in 1989, the
Supreme Court has never found
a new rule of criminal procedure
to be “watershed.” And Miller
does no more than tell states
that before sentencing a juvenile
to LWOP the judge must be
allowed the option of choosing a
lesser penalty. That’s important,
but it’s hardly “watershed” stuff.
To its credit, a 5th District
panel, in People v. Johnson (2013),

seemed to acknowledge the
irreconcilability of the two 1st
District opinions, but instead of
articulating its own position,
stated only that “we agree with
our colleagues in the 1st District”
that Miller should be applied
retroactively. What a mess!
Here’s the problem as I see it.
The appellate judges in our state
believe fairness dictates that
they apply the Miller rule across
the board to all juvenile defendants who were given mandatory
LWOP sentences for their
murder convictions. But a fair
application of the Teague
doctrine can’t get them to that

result.
That’s unfortunate, but it’s
dictated by the Illinois Supreme
Court’s (arguably ill-considered)
decision to adopt the Teague
retroactivity rules in the first
place. The proper course of
action is for the appellate courts
to faithfully apply Teague and
leave it to the state Supreme
Court to modify its retroactivity
rules if it deems appropriate.
Of course, there is another
option. The Illinois General
Assembly could pass legislation,
as other states have done, that
would authorize resentencing
hearings for each of the 105

defendants who were given
mandatory LWOP sentences for
murders committed while they
were minors.
Legislation would allow the
Illinois Supreme Court to dodge
having to decide whether to
apply its retroactivity doctrine in
good faith or allow resentencing
to proceed in already-final cases.
The first approach would
effectively deny any hope for
defendants sentenced under an
unconstitutional scheme. The
second would undermine rule of
law values. Ideally, the court will
not have to make that Hobson’s
choice.
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